KOREA FOCUS

U.S. Policy in Korea Threatens World Destruction

Pages 1 and 6

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The South Korean CIA

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Ghost of the Beast of Belsen

Back Cover

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Speaking Frankly

To all American-Korean Friendship and Information Center (AKFIC) friends and supporters. To all *Korea Focus* readers:

Dear Friends:

An explanation is in order:

The non-appearance of *Korea Focus* during the latter part of 1975 should lay to rest whatever lingering doubts there may be about the shoestring budget on which we operate.

It seems ironic in this post-Vietnam era, when anti-imperialist sentiment in the U.S. is at its highest, that AKFIC, under pressure of a serious economic pinch, should be faced with the need for deep retrenchment. Why is this so? The economic crisis in our country has had a most devastating effect on our budget. Due to increasing unemployment and spiralling inflation, our income has been rapidly dwindling; in many cases it is drying up both in amount and in continuity of contributions.

A second reason for the non-appearance of our publication was the crtical turn of events in Korea following the end of the Indochinese war. We decided then it was necessary to respond decisively to this dangerous turn of events and, instead of investing whatever finances we had available in another issue of *Korea Focus,* we rushed to publish, mail and circulate 50,000 copies of our brochure, *Korea: Uneasy Truce in the Land of the Morning Calm,* which was a call to action to mobilize Americans against the new dangers from the atom bomb thugs.

Following this, our long-delayed book, *North Korea Journey: A Revolution Against Colonialism,* by our co-Chairman, Prof. Fred J. Carrier, was about to come off the press. To meet the critical situation, we had agreed to finance the immediate publication and distribution of 5,000 copies of this timely and important work as an added response to the anti-Korean war hysteria. It should not be surprising, under these circumstances, that we had to accept a temporary suspension of the publication of *Korea Focus.* The response to our appeal from peace-minded, anti-imperialist supporters and friends of Korea has enabled us to proceed with the preparation of this issue of *Korea Focus.*

May we take this opportunity to express our most sincere thanks and appreciation for your continued cooperation and support.

Faithfully yours,

Executive Board, AKFIC
Editorial Board, *Korea Focus*

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Korea Focus

WINTER-SPRING 1976

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BACK ISSUES

Because of the growing interest in Korea there has been an increased demand for back copies of our publication, Korea Focus. We are completely out of Vol. I, No. 3, and a number of other back issues. We appeal to our readers, please do not dispose of back copies of Korea Focus. Send them to us and we will pay the postage.

An Editorial

Korea in the Post-Vietnam Era

Following the defeat of U.S. imperialism in Indochina, a stream of charges under the false cry of an "imminent threat from the North" have issued from Washington, fraudulently portraying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country bent on invasion of South Korea, thus promoting fears of a new Korean war at home and spreading sensational war scares among the people of South Korea, to help bolster the U.S. puppet Pak Jung Hi, who uses these war scares to further tighten the screws of oppression via new fascist decrees.

The defeated war hawks, driven out of Indochina, refuse to accept history's verdict and the battlefield decision.

The architects of atomic slaughter (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) are out to subvert, and if possible, reverse the consequences of the peoples victories in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Under false slogans and discordant tunes of "reconciliation," "no recriminations," "put Vietnam behind us," they are attempting once again to coerce the U.S. people into supporting their aggressive, predatory foreign policy in Asia. This time, especially, in Korea.

In their desperation, anger, frustration and defeat, they are using lies, deception and slander, with the help of the monopoly-controlled sensation media, to create a lynchmob atmosphere against the Korean people, hoping to inflame and organize a racist hunting party against the Korean people, in the first place, against the Democratic Republic in the North, and to drown in blood, with the aid of the puppet, Pak Jung Hi, the resistance of the South Korean people to fascist oppression.

A quarter of a century after the start of that war, once again Korea is at the forefornt of imperialist confrontation in Asia. Why Korea again at this time?

Central to the question is the outcome of the long war in Indochina. The victory of the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia has accomplished their liberation, an occasion for joy through much of



the world. Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese after a century of domination by France, Japan and the United States. But the Vietnamese victory does not stop there, for it has dealt a serious blow to U.S. imperialism and weakened it throughout Asia. A quarter of a century effort by the U.S. to preserve a neocolonial regime in South Vietnam, a military dependent akin to that of a South Korea with a comparable role of maintaining U.S. domination in Southeast Asia, has come to an end. Not only has Indochina been

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"lost" to the U.S.-led alliance system but countries like Thailand and the Philippines which all through the Vietnam war served as bases for U.S. air power have taken steps to either eliminate or curtail military presence. It is only natural, under these circumstances, that in Korea which is divided because of U.S. preservation of a neocolonial South Korea, the liberation forces should experience renewed hope for unity.

For U.S. government and military leaders the defeat in Vietnam was a disaster. Did it presage an end to U.S. domination over much of Asia? Did it reveal an inability or unwillingness on the part of the American people to uphold costly military commitments which preserved a world secure to imperialist interests? What seemed essential to the U.S. government was to reaffirm quickly remaining military "commitment" and to demonstrate dramatically a capacity for military action. Hence, the Mayaguez attack was launched and even heralded as proof of American staying-power. In this way the U.S. sought to disprove its earlier defeat.

Of strategic importance to neocolonial interests in Asia is the preservation of a capitalist Korea militarily tied to the U.S. For this reason Korea became the first arena of the Cold War in Asia and it may prove to be the last remnant. From 1945 on Korea has served as a U.S. military base "to contain communism" (regardless of what the Korean people might wish) and to secure a strong capitalist Japan. How important that base is to the U.S. imperialist policy was demonstrated by the Korean war from 1950-1953 which kept Korean divided at the cost of 54,000 American lives and more than 1,000,000 Asians.

This new war scare is raised by U.S. officials despite repeated proclamations by the DPRK that its goal is the peaceful unification of the country consistent with the will of the Korean people. On his tour which included China, Rumania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Premier Kim Il Sung sought to build support for just such an attempt at peaceful unification. The 42,000 American force equipped with tactical nuclear weapons which remained in South Korea under authorization extended by the United Nations in 1950 have now been invalidated. At its 1975 30th Session, the United Nations General Assembly, led by the Socialist and Third World countries, decided by a majority vote to terminate its sanction for these U.S. forces to remain in Korea.

STOP THE WAR CRIMINALS NOW

According to press reports of October 1975, the then Secretary of War, Schlesinger, with President Ford's blessing, has ordered U.S. bomber crews to begin special training for a "limited" nuclear war.

It has always been assumed by the Congress and every sane American that the President would never activate our nuclear weapons unless our country were under nuclear attack. But FIRST STRIKE by the U.S. became official administration policy last June 1975 when Schlesinger claimed that we have always had this option and ordered bomber crews to prepare for such action.

The Ford Administration is not only thinking about the unthinkable, but has put aside the Pentagon's MAD strategy (Mutual Assured Destruction) for a MADDER reality—actual steps toward the initiation of nuclear war!

The Federation of American Scientists has asked the critical question—"Who decides?" They point out:

". . . there is no need to respond instantaneously with a nuclear weapon to a conventional attack. There will be time to consider what to do. A fundamental conclusion springs from this: It is not necessary to leave this decision in the hands of a single decision maker. . .

"Under the War Powers Resolution, the President can engage in hostilities for up to sixty days unless Congress votes to prevent him from so continuing. And nothing in that act refers to the tactics or the weapons that he may use. He may turn an undeclared conventional war into a full-scale nuclear way without any legal requirement to consult with Congress."

Some senators and congressmen are now introducing resolutions requiring congressional approval to any first use of nuclear weapons. What difference does it make whether Mother Earth is atomized with or without congressional approval? Why not a resolution outlawing all nuclear weapons first or last strike?

There are madmen at the controls of the U.S. spaceship in the western hemispehere, and as horrified passengers we must insist that sanity be restored.

It is important for the peace movement to assess correctly both the dangers of war and the prospects for peaceful change in Korea. There is a great deal of bluster in U.S. charges of "imminent aggression from the north" and in U.S threats to resort to nuclear retaliation. Faced with an alliance system that is disintegrating and a policy that has failed "tragically," the U.S. is determined to strengthen its hold on South Korea in order to forestall any further erosion of its military position. For U.S. policy a threat of war serves many purposes, all of which revolve around the justification for continuing U.S. occupation: U.S. troops are need to "stop aggression," an expanded military budget is needed to provide "security" to the "free world," support of a dictatorial regime is the better of two evils.

But here is a serious weakness in an ally like South Korea, ruled by the martial law regime of Pak Jung Hi which lacks an extensive popular base among workers and peasants, and which increasingly represses its own students, religious and intellectual leaders. Such a regime is a liability because it cannot alleviate or hide internal discontent which not only poses danger of revolution but also spoils the regime's palatability for an American people weary with defending that kind of "freedom" in Asia. To counter this exposure of the realities of South Korea, the U.S. seeks to strengthen the image of Pak as a defender of the "free world" against "a militarist, communist north." It is rather a weary ploy, to be sure, after Diem, Ky and Thieu in Vietnam, but the U.S. is stuck with a discredited Cold War script.

The top brass, by their own admission, do not believe their own propaganda. In a recent Seoul-datelined report by Jack Anderson, long a conduit for "intelligence" handouts, we learn that "the fears that North Korea might resume the Korean war are subsiding. An intelligence estimate from the U.S. Embassy discounts the likelihood that North Korea's Kim Il Sung will attack." This view is shared, incidentally, by the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon. The following is quoted from the Wall Street Journal of June 27, 1975:

> "New Korean war? Scare stories are overdone, U.S. analysts say. They find outlook calm, dismiss war talk. . . . More rhetoric than reality. When you read the intelligence reports, you don't get scared. The intelligence community is chuckling over the worry (war scares) aired in the Press," so say U.S. officials.
>
> The Wall Street Journal continues:
>
> ". . . South Korean President Pak Chung Hi whips up concern to ensure continued U.S. military support. . . . Pak exploits war fear for tighter-than -ever control over his political foes." (The South Korean people.)
>
> *Time* Magazine, April 28, 1975 stated:
>
> "In the opinion of senior U.S. officials in the Pentagon, the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, South Korea does not face an imminent attack from the north."

"A greater threat," U.S. officials warn privately, "is that Pak's repressive measures, taken in the name of internal security, may bring massive public protests against him or even a coup.

"There could be an ugly confrontation. Pak has exacerbated the situation," said a leading U.S. expert. "There is growing concern in Washington that Pak is following what U.S. officials describe as the 'worst approach.' "

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Weyand, June 20, 1975 declared:

> "There is 'very little chance of a major attack from the north.' "

* * *

The realities in Korea are different than U.S. policy invents. First in importance, the DPRK is a socialist country with strong support from its people. North Koreans have worked hard through the last two decades to rebuild cities, factories, schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. They are proud of their accomplishments and are not about to throw all of this material wealth away (not to mention their lives) in a reckless bid to unify their country by war. What they do want, and justifiably, is the end of U.S. occupation so that the Korean people can peacefully pursue the course of reunification.

Another factor, only second in importance to the internal strength and peaceful motivation of the DPRK, is that it has friendly relations and

The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, October 15, 1975

Both before and after his Schlesinger 'tough talk' visit to Seoul, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger told his nation that he would consider "first use of nuclear weapons if the going should prove too rough for the South Korean forces in an all-out clash with the North Korean.

. . . Mrs. Schlesinger has been expounding his doctrine of preventive strike for some time and one fears . . . he might urge a nuclear attack unprovoked, in the name of "prevention."

If Mr. Schlesinger is telling everything, I am sorry to say, his nuclear strategy seems fraught with peril. But to justify his threats on grounds of friendship to the Korean people would be insane, even though he has probably been encouraged to do so by his appreciative hosts in Seoul. Friendships among nations move through circuitous paths and sometimes end up in the most unexpected places. But the American people would be wrong, ruefully wrong, to assume that they can blast a nuclear bomb anywhere north of the DMZ and expect the people in the South to celebrate American-Korean solidarity.

It is sincerely hoped that the more enlightened elements of this great nation will not remain so airily indifferent to the horrifying implications of nuclear brinkmanship as to have no word of honest concern over the saber rattling of some of their public officials. Surely, they understand that the only sane approach to the Korean problem—a problem which their leaders helped to create over 30 years ago—is a political rather than a military one. And a political approach demands a good deal more than toughness, particularly when the adversary appears to be interested . . . in establishing some sort of dialogue with United States.

Sugwon Kang
Oneonta, N.Y.

military ties to both the USSR and the People's Republic of China and the support of the entire socialist world community, and the sympathy of the liberated, independent former colonial countries (usually referred to as the Third World).

Even while recognizing the element of bluster and brinkmanship in U.S. policy, outweighed by the positive indications toward peaceful change, it would be unrealistic to ignore the real danger of war in Korea. Since 1953 when the Korean War ended by an armistice, the U.S. had maintained a large army in South Korea and a nuclear air force. The U.S. claims to be assisting a "free" country when in reality it is preserving a protectorate. South Korea's military dictatorship demands the presence of American soldiers despite the fact that the South's population is more than twice as large as in the DPRK, simply because it is the Korean people who must be repressed.

"Under the guise of promoting stability, the U.S. is presiding over an increasingly unstable position here in South Korea." *New York Times,* July 10, 1975.

Clearly there is a striking parallel between Korea and Vietnam where the U.S. erected a puppet state in South Vietnam that was totally dependent on U.S. money, arms and advisors. For twenty years the U.S. sought to crush a liberation struggle that continually grew in strength despite the enormous efforts exerted by the Pentagon there. More than $150 billion spent on destruction, close to 7.5 million tons of bombs or 3.5 times more than in the 2nd World War, were dropped on Vietnam. The Pentagon established the world's fourth largest air force in Viet Nam during that war. A total of 2,500,000 armed officers and men passed through Vietnam.

A total of 56,244 Americans were returned home in zinc coffins, and 300,635 were wounded, of which more than half were crippled for life.

A total of 8,612 U.S. planes and helicopters were brought down by the valiant Vietnamese liberation and peace fighters. The attempt to defeat Indochina via U.S. intervention failed; the losses were in vain. The changes that took place in Vietnam were irreversible. This lesson must be seriously taken into account by the people of our nation in respect to our government's Korean policies. As long as U.S. soldiers are in Korea, and the just aspirations of the Korean people for the end of foreign occupation and one Korean nation remain alive, there is danger that the U.S. may once again resort to war in order to prevent national liberation, and suffer similar consequences.

There are many lessons to be drawn from the Indochina War, but no meaningful analysis would make light of the U.S. military power. While the U.S. defeat was real, it did not come because of a lack of power to destroy whatever was designated. What the U.S. proved incapable of doing was creating a political and social future for Vietnam, a building task that can only be done by the people who comprise the nation.

In Korea, likewise, the potential for destruction resides in the very fact of foreign occupation.

To the present the U.S. brazenly declares—as it did during a quarter of a century of trying to foist Chiang Kai-shek upon the Chinese people, Lon Nol upon the Cambodians, and Thieu upon the Vietnamese—that its policy is concerned with the freedom of the Korean people. This hypocrisy is barred by the martial law imposed upon the people of South Korea in order to silence every call for the end of economic exploitation and foreign occupation. For the people of South Korea, freedom, economic security, reunification can only begin when foreign domination ends.

Japan Times, March 1, 1975 reported:

"South Korea is already deeply in debt. Some economists estimated that just to pay back the principle and interest on the foreign funds borrowed to date, it will have to earmark

CAUSE FOR REGRET

"Once more, an American Secretary of Defense arrives with reinforcements for an Asian ally. Again, there is grandiloquent talk about holding the front line of freedom. And for what seems the thousandth time, the U.S. is actually fortifying an entrenched despot, occupying one of the next to last ditches.

"The dismal spectacle has just been reenacted in Korea, where Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, with a snappy salute to the Pak regime, spoke warmly of 'the high regard of the American people for their Korean allies and the continuing commitment of the United States to the common defense.' The Communists, in the same breath, are warned against 'miscalculation.' But how much serious calculation has gone into U.S. policy toward Seoul? What honest common cause can be made with Pak, whose repressions are so extensive that even public criticism of his 'emergency' orders is now illegal? Isn't it apparent that this autocratic arrogance is certain to destabilize the regime ultimately, despite its formidable defense now? What American interest is served by close identification with the Pak Jung Hi despotism? What new opportunities for accommodations in Asia are being turned aside in favor of that abysmal alliance?"

New York Post, August 1975
Editorial

as much as 60% of the money it has scheduled to borrow from abroad for the years 1973-1981.

"South Korea's foreign debts now stand at tens of billions of dollars, with an annual trade deficit running at a rate of $2.4 billion. The World Bank, on July 4th, stressed the urgency to pour $2 billion into South Korea every year to alleviate its economic crisis."

"The Republic of (South) Korea is headed for default on her debts abroad and economic chaos at home, if current confidential estimates being circulated at the State and Treasury Departments can be believed. The implications of the unpublished reports for American policy are equally alarming."

From a report released December 8, 1975
by the Institute for International Policy (IIP)
on South Korea's economy.

The *WALL STREET JOURNAL* reported that South Korea recently launched a many-thousand ton tanker in its Pohang shipyards, but its design is British, its engine Dutch made, its steel imported from Japan, and the only thing South Korea addes was space for construction and *extremely cheap labor.*

UPI REPORTED ON February 5, 1975:

"South Korea is starting the new year with prices still rocketing and the lines of jobless getting longer as the cruel effects of the energy shortage and world-wide recession continue to effect the economy."

* * *

The cause of peace requires a renewed struggle by our people for the dismantling of all foreign bases held by the USA.

The lesson of the Indochina war must be clearly understood—foreign military bases are a threat to world peace, and are the chief armed beachheads for imperialist aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other people.

The U.S. — our ruling class — now has over 2,000 military bases in 22 countries, manned by over 500,000 U.S. military personnel. In the Pacific, the U.S. and its allies, old and new, are occupying and manning military bases on other peoples' lands, from South Korea through Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines and Thailand. Many of these bases are manned by 130,000 U.S. military personnel, 42,000 of them in South Korea alone.

The withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces and atomic weapons from South Korea is decisive for the fulfillment of the Korean peoples' aspiration for the peaceful and independent restoration of a united Korean nation.

Realism demands that U.S. imperialism face up to the facts. They lost the war in Vietnam; they cannot win such wars in this new period of history. They did not lose because of a lack of military power or efforts—they lost because they underestimated and cynically disregarded the passionate desire of the people at home and abroad to resist imperialist aggression, to stop the interference in the internal affairs of other people and to give all out support and inspiration to the peoples struggling for national indepencence.

We seldom agree with New York senior Senator, Jacob K. Javits, but in respect to what he said to the Asian Society of September 4, 1975, we join in saying "amen." Javits declared:

"The U.S. should drop its opposition to communism in Asia and base a new Asian policy on a positive premise—i.e.—the national interests of U.S., interests keyed to peace, industrial and commercial development and the preservation of human rights, in place of the old negative premise of opposition to communism."

Whether there is war in Korea is entirely up to the U.S. imperialists. Whether such a war actually takes place, that the American people must decide. The people of the USA fought against the war in Vietnam; the people of the U.S. learning the lesson from Vietnam must now organize to stop the U.S. monopolists from starting such a war for the second time in Korea.

It behooves us, the American people, to end our government's imperialist policy and thus end the threat of war in Korea. As Americans we have neither the right nor the need to perpetuate the colonial status of a part of Korea. The demand of our government "NO MORE VIETNAMS!" "NO MORE HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI MASSACRES."

The Korean War Danger

By DANIEL B. SCHIRMER

Post Vietnam there are two areas of the world where the possibilities of war breaking out are real: the Mideast and the Korean peninsula. If I were a betting man, I would bet against a war in either place; but i wouldn't bet very much in the case of Korea.

This was the comment a government official made to William Beecher of the *Boston Globe's* Washington Bureau at the end of June.[1]

What gives this remark a chilling effect is the bellicose attitude of President Ford and former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who have both recently hinted that the United States would use nuclear weapons should North Korea attack South Korea. Schlesinger even spelled it out, saying that in the event of such an attack "it is necessary to go for the heart of the opponent's power; destroy his military forces . . . more vigorous action . . . than the Vietnam War."[2]

Whence comes this new war danger? Does it come from the prospect of an attack by the North? On this question, the *Globe's* Beecher reported, "Although White House, Defense officials and State Department officials are unwilling to rule out the possibility that North Korea will launch a full scale invasion any time soon, most analysts doubt this will happen."[3] Early in May the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported from Seoul that Western military intelligence doubted that North Korea planned an invasion, and that Western diplomats "believe the Park Government is deliberately exaggerating the dangers in an effort to justify the continuing repression of liberal dissent in South Korea."[4]

Japan, like the United States, has been heavily committed to South Korea; but government personalities in Tokyo too have expressed the belief that there was little danger of war from the North. Just over a year ago Japan's Foreign Minister Kimura flatly denied that South Korea faced a military threat from North Korea.[5] More recently Rep. Tokuma Utsunomiya, of Japan's ruling party's Asian-African Study Group, after a visit to North Korea, declared his belief that the North would not initiate a war.[6]

The *Sunday Mainichi*, an independent Japanese paper that carried Rep. Utsunomiya's story, speculated on probable causes of a war in Korea. Pointing to the 38th parallel which divides North Korea from South Korea, with 467,000 North Korean and 625,000 South Korean troops ranged on either side, the paper said:

> "There is a real possibility that a series of small conflicts along the border may escalate into a full-scale war at any moment. It is conceivable also that South Korea will advance North across the border in order to involve the U.S. and Japan in a war and to smash anti-government forces."[7]

This speculation carries us nearer to what appears to be one source of the war danger: the difficulties of the South Korean dictatorship in the post-Vietnam era.

In 1974 President Pak Jung Hi faced his worst economic and political crisis since he seized power 14 years ago (in addition to a growing diplomatic isolation as registered, for example, in adverse U.N. votes). Relying on the United States and Japan to absorb over 70 per cent of the products of an export-oriented economy, South Korea faced a severe slump due to the recession in both of its main trading partners. Under the impact of an inflation estimated at well over 40 per cent, South Korean living standards plummeted.

On the political field, domestic opposition grew to embrace nearly every sector of the Korean people.[8] In response the dictatorship has this year meted out executions, arrests, new draconian emergency decrees—all justified on the basis of the loudly proclaimed "menace from the North" and the need to put the South on a war footing. (Even now Pak holds the outstanding poet Kim Chi Ha under threat of death for his criticism of the dictatorship.) There are many indications that, as the Tokyo paper suggests, Pak would not be averse to a war "to smash the anti-

government forces."

If the foregoing has reality, then the Ford Administration's threat of nuclear bombing seems to be less a means of discouraging the North from a war that it does not appear to be planning than a means of encouraging the South in its very evident policies of repression and belligerence, and the Administration's purpose, which it claims to be pacific, seems, in fact, to be something else.

This leads us to what may be seen as the second source of the war danger (as closely connected to the first as is the metropolitan power to the neocolony): the difficulties of the United States after the defeat in Vietnam. Here to be noted, besides the major blow to the U.S. imperial position in Asia, are the uncertainties in Greece and Portugal, the balkiness of Congress, and the growing domestic dissatisfaction with established foreign policy—all signs of an accumulating crisis.

The show of force associated with the Mayaguez incident indicated the Administration's prescription for this galloping decline. But Mayaguez was obviously not enough, so the thoughts of statesmen turn to Korea. Let the former Defense Secretary himself explain the matter (as he did recently to Drew Middleton of the *New York Times):*

> "The major issue, Mr. Schlesinger believes, is how far the American people will allow the international situation to deteriorate before they rouse themselves for a national effort. It may take, he said pessimistically, 'something like Korea' to alter present attitudes."[9]

The extraordinary bombing ordered by the Ford Administration at the time of the Mayaguez incident bears a relation to this spring's (1974) arrests, executions, and emergency decrees in Seoul; they both betray a fury born of desperation, a tendency to irrationality and overreaction. A common mood affects the present rulers of South Korea and the United States, causing both to flirt with the possibility of a new Korean war as a resolution to their massive difficulties and frustrations.

What makes the Korean situation so alarming and so unique is the way all the combustible materials are neatly piled together. First there is the question of an incident, some violence, something shocking and provocative, to set things off in the manner of the Tonkin Gulf. There are those who know South Korea today who believe that the Pak regime has capabilities of this sort. Yong Lee Wun, former South Korean Navy Chief of Staff, told a press conference in Tokyo in January 1975 that "Every alleged threatening act by the North, whether charged by Syngman Rhee or Pak Jung Hi, was without exception a provocative act by the forces of South Korea."[10]

An American Maryknoll missionary, Father James P. Sincott, recently expelled by the Pak regime for speaking out in defense of civil liberties after 15 years in south Korea, has been lobbying members of Congress in Washington, telling them to think twice before they act should they hear that a South Korean village just below the 38th parallel has been invaded by North Korean troops and all the men, women, and children there murdered in cold blood. It might just be, warns Father Sinnott, that these were South Korean troops in North Korean uniforms.[11]

Then there is the matter of U.S. involvement. There are now 42,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. As I. F. Stone wrote in the *New York Times,* June 2:

> "Present deployment puts the bulk of our troops right at the 38th parallel, where even a small scale border clash would involve United States troops immediately . . . our military deployment in Korea . . . would make United States involvement automatic and inescapable."

These 42,000 U.S. troops now in South Korea are a hangover, of course, from U.S. participation in the first Korean war. And indeed the whole prospect now unfolding jars the sensibilities like a recurrent nightmare. For I. F. Stone in his *Hidden History of the Korean War* tells us that it is not impossible that a South Korean provocation (a feint across the border) may have touched off the previous conflict, and Joyce and Gabriel Kolko in *The Limits of Power* point to the Truman Administration's unhesitating embrace of the first Korean war as a way out of the domestic and international difficulties that plagued U.S. Cold War policies just after World War II.[12]

General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., in charge of U.S. Air Force saturation bombing in the early months of the first war told Congress "almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name . . .," and the hardened militarist MacArthur said he puked at the sight of the carnage of women and children. There were 4.5 million casualities then.[13] Now Schlesinger

proposes the atom bomb. . . .

There is one big difference since 1950 and the first Korean war that is very important to those who might think it wise to offset our government's present policy. That is the change in popular consciousness brought on by the Vietnam War and the struggle against it. This could be the undoing of those in power who now bring in view a new Korean war and nuclear bombing. Look at the figures from the latest Harris poll. According to them there is now a 52-53 per cent majority of Americans who oppose the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea, and Harris comments, "The greatest opposition to U.S. using nuclear strategy comes from the same group who opposed the Vietnam War: Easterners and Westerners, suburban residents, people under 30, the college educated and the independent voters."

Moreover, a 46-37 per cent plurality now opposes using U.S. troops, air power, and naval power to defend South Korea. This represents a turn-around since last May when 43-37 per cent favored using U.S. forces for such a purpose. Harris lays this change in sentiment to Schlesinger's threat to use the atom bomb.[14]

As in its policy generally, the Ford Administration's attitude to Korea is geared to the interests of big business. U.S. multi-nationals now have an investment of $185 million in South Korea where wages are low, strikes forbidden, and profits high. Gulf, Shell, and Texaco now explore for oil off the shore of South Korea with the encouragement of Seoul (remember Gulf's recently exposed $4 million slush fund for Park).[15]

While there are unquestionably these direct economic links in the picture, there is, at the same time, much more to it than that. The Ford Administration evidently toys with the idea of a Korean war, nuclear bombs and all, as a means of reversing the tide that has begun to run so strong against the U.S. multi-national empire, at home and abroad, since Vietnam. The stakes are nothing less.

On the other hand, many people in the United States, after the Vietnam experience, are in a mood that could lead them to try to stop this war before it begins. With the world as it is today, they might just succeed.

POSTSCRIPT: December 1975 brought forward more evidence of the pressures for a new Korean war that are accumulating in both South Korea and the United States. Early in the month the Institute for International Policy in Washington, D.C., released a study declaring that "The Republic of Korea is headed for default on her debts abroad and economic chaos at home, if confidential estimates being circulated at the State and Treasury Departments can be believed." Further stating that only U.S. bilateral support could provide the financial assistance South Korea needed to avoid collapse, the study suggested that "Anything less than a major resumption of border hostilities will fail to pry loose the required sums from Congress." Doubtless the Pak government has considerations such as these very much in mind as the new year opens.

In a complementary fashion the December issue of *The Ladies' Home Journal* indicated that a war in Korea continues to figure in the thinking of the most reactionary and bellicose members of the U.S. imperial establishment. The magazine carried an interview with ex-President Nixon quoting him as follows: "We are so cynical, so mnbelieving—it may take the shock of an invasion—in Korea or in Thailand. If American lives are threatened, we may regain our sense of belief in our country and our need for strength." Earlier Schlesinger emphasized the deterioration in the world position of the U.S. empire; now Nixon points to the growing domestic disillusionment that is the internal reflex of this deterioration. Both agree: a war in Korea might solve the problem.

1. *Boston Globe,* June 29, 1975.
2. TRB, *New Republic,* July 26, 1975.
3. *Boston Globe,* June 29, 1975.
4. *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 2, 1975.
5. *Korea Bulletin,* January, 1975.
6. *Atlas,* July, 1975.
7. Ibid.
8. *Korea Bulletin,* January, 1975.
9. *New York Times,* May 5, 1975.
10. *Korea Link,* March/April, 1975.
11. Telephone conversation with Father Sinnott, August 4, 1975.
12. I. F. Stone, *Hidden History of the Korean War,* p. 44; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power,* ch. 21.
13. I. F. Stone, op. cit., p. 312; Frank Baldwin, editor, *Without Parellel,* pp. 142, 18.
14. *New York Evening Post,* August 1, 1975.
15. *Korea Link,* March/April, 1975; *Far Eastern Economic Review,* August 1, June 20, 1975.

The DPRK Fulfills 6-year Plan on all Fronts of Economic Construction

By PROF. FRED J. CARRIER

The fall of 1975 marked a signal accomplishment for the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: fulfillment of their Six Year Plan (scheduled for 1971 through 1976) with more than a year to spare. With attainment of 1976 production goals in heavy machinery, the total plan was virtually accomplished. In key industries—coal, electric power, machine tools, chemical, fertilizer, tractors—1976 quotas have been reached, while in steel, pig iron and cement about 90 percent of the goal was fulfilled.

According to government figures, by September of 1975 the Six Year Plan targets were fulfilled in 5,126 factories or enterprises. Annual industrial production had reached a value of 2.2 times that of 1970, the target envisioned by the

Spinners of the February 8 Vinalon Complex.



Assembling rail coaches in Pyong Yang plant.

Plan. During this period more than 1,000 factories were built which in turn contributed to this production growth.

To cite some specific gains, 49.5 million tons of coal were mined in 1975 compared to 4 million tons in 1949; electric power increased to 28 million kilowatt hours from the 1949 total of 6 million; steel production reached 3.3 million tons compared to the 1949 figure of 144,000. In one area, textiles, the goal of self-sufficiency has been more than surpassed. Production in 1949 was 22 million miters of cloth, but in 1975 it was 720 million meters (about 50 meters *per capita).*

Equally important, in this era when world hunger afflicts nearly half the world's people, the DPRK has been able to double its grain production since 1963, with a haravest currently running above 7 million tons. Thus it has attained food self-sufficiency with nearly one-half ton of grain *per capita.* This compares with the U.S. which has more than one ton *per capita* and grain-hungry India which has about .2 ton. The DPRK has revised its target for 1976 to 10 million tons of grain.

Since about half of the increased industrial productivity occurred in consumer goods, family income was nearly double in 1975 what it had been in 1970. This raised standard of living is also reflected in cultural and educational improvements. One of the impressive gains was the expansion in 1975 of the former 10-year universal education program to 11 years. It is important to note that this education is truly universal, applying equally to the children on cooperative farms.

Other significant improvements have been made in rural areas with the conversion of thousands of cooperative farm clinics into small hospitals. This, of course, implies not only the increased supply of technical equipment but the training of many more doctors, nurses, dentists and other personnel. Bus service now reaches all the peasant areas, and water works have been

installed in 87 percent of the villages. This attempt to raise the standards of peasant life toward the level of urban life was one of the important goals of the Six Year Plan.

The accompanying table indicates the steady and rapid growth which the DPRK has experienced during two decades of socialism since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

Figures are provided by the Central Statistical Board of the DPRK, as reported in *The Pyongyang Times,* Sept. 27 1975, and *The People's Korea,* Oct. 1, 1975.

Index of Industrial Productivity, 1949-1975
(1956 production = 1

*Year**	*Total Production*	*Industrial Goods*	*Consumer Goods*
1956	1	1	1
1960	3.5	3.6	3.3
1970	11.6	13.3	9.3
1975	25.5	30.6	19.5

* The years cited represent the times at which different plans were fulfilled.

	As of end of Aug. 1975 compared with 1970
Gross Industrial Output Value	2.2 (times)
Production of means of production	2.3
Production of consumer goods	2.1

Output of Major Industrial Products

	Rate of fulfilment of Production Goal set for 1976 (per cent)	*Growth compared with 1970 (times)*
Electric power	102	1.7
Coal	101	1.8
Pig iron and granulated iron	92	1.7
Steel	86	1.5
Chemical Fertilizer	109	2
Vinalon	114	3.6
Vinyl chloride	108	3.3
Machine tools	111	2.4
Tractors	101	8.7
Trucks	103	2.4
Cement	91	1.7
Textiles	116	1.8
Underwear	105	1.5
Sweaters and jackets	268	5.6
Shoes	115	2.2
Aquatic products	104	1.5
Foodstuffs output value	102	2.4
output value of daily necessities	113	2

Gross Harvests of Main Kinds Of Agriculture Crops (1970-1974)

Grain	Over 7 million tons
Meat	1.4 times (1970-1)
Eggs	1.8
Cocoons	2.2
Fruits	1.5
Vegetables	1.4

People's Life–The prices of consumer goods dropped by an average of 30 per cent.

	1974	*(1970=1)*
National income	1.7 times	
Factory and office Workers	1.5	
Peasants (per household)	1.6	
Retail turnover	1.8	

Cultural Revolution (1970-Aug. 1975)

- Universal 11-yr. compulsory education has been enforced on full scale.
- Number of intellectuals amounted to 1 million; 523,000 technicians, specialists were trained.

Data on the mechanization level of major categories of farm work:

Categories of work	*1970 (per cent)*	*1974-75 (per cent)*
Tillage of paddy and non-paddy fields	61	100
Rice-transplanting	0	92
Weeding	12	55
Harvesting	8	66
Thrashing	87	100
Fodder crushing	78	100
Transport	59	100

Bumper Crops in the DPRK

By FUJISHIMA UDAI

A Japanese visitor to the DPRK

In the DPRK the grain output this autumn is expected to be a record figure in history. More than 8 million tons of grain set as a target will be produced this year.

If it were before liberation, hundreds of thousands of farm households would have failed in farming in Korea under such weather conditions as this year's.

But the biggest bumper crops ever in history have been brought in today and a prospect has been opened to surpass a high level of 10 million tons in the future.

The rice output per chongbo (one chongbo approximates one hectare) last year was 5.9 tons, outstripping Japan (5.8 tons).

It is certain that this year it will surpass Japan and the gap between the two countries will grow wider in the future.

If it were in the bygone days, drought like this year's would have caused a serious crop failure.

But a bumper harvest has been reaped despite the unfavorable weather conditions of this year. Needless to say, this is attributable entirely to the irrigation system to which consistent efforts have been directed in this country since liberation.

The DPRK has given precedence to irrigation in the rural technical revolution from the time of the agrarian reform right after liberation, as part of the technical revolution concentrating on—1. irrigation, 2. electrification, 3. mechanization and 4. chemicalization, to obtain a high yield and secure harvest from the view that agricultural production is a biological process. It was all the more important in the agriculture of Korea where main emphasis is laid on paddy field farming.

President Kim Il Sung, who gained broad knowledge about agriculture in the period of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, contributed to the plans which helped to transform the land of the country. From that time on, he personally did experimental farming in his home and helped on farms in different parts of the country, always discussed farming methods with farmers and scholars.

Irrigation Channels

The reservoirs and irrigation channels of this country had been built in a diversified way in accordance with the local topographical conditions, which give an impression that they are crisscrossing the country.

At present there have been built 150 reservoirs, big and small, in the DPRK. We cite only big ones from the north on the western coast, where there are the Lake Manpung-ho of the Amnok-gang irrigation watering 100,000 chongbo of land, the Taesong Reservoir of the Kiyang irrigation watering 51,000 of land, the Lake Yonpung-ho of the Pyongnam irrigation watering 100,000 chongbo of land, the Lake Sohung-ho of the Ojidan irrigation watering 44,000 chongbo of land and the Singye and Kuam Reservoirs of the Singyye irrigation and the Yonbaek irrigation watering a total of 80,000 chongbo of land.

Each reservoir is linked with a neighboring reservoir by irrigation channels or big and small reservoirs, so that water can be used in accordance with each other's need.

And water does not flow into the sea but is stored again after feeding the fields. This is called a great circulating method.

Irrigation channels looked like a net from the plane. So far irrigation set-ups have been completed to water 700,000 chongbo of paddy fields and 300,000 chongbo of non-paddy fields. There is a plan to introduce water sprinkling irrigation into 700,000 chongbo of maize fields. Water sprinkling irrigation has already been introduced into a vast area of vegetable fields. I was told that the total length of the already built irrigation channels is as long as going around the earth once.

The socialist construction in the countryside of this country has developed on the basis of the "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in our Country" as projected by the Korean Workers Party headed by Kim Il Sung.

The theses set the technical, cultural and ideological revolutions as three pillars in the countryside, and put forward the targets to accelerate them with the assistance of the state (all people's ownership) and realize the conversion of cooperative ownership, the complete industrialization of agriculture and developing the peasantry into a working class part of this continuing building of a classless communist society.

These targets were regarded as an ideal at the time when the theses was made public. But today, 11 years after its publication, these targets have become realistic and time has come to materialize them.

In the technical revolution, irrigation as mentioned above and electrification was realized in the 1960's. In mechanization, to take tractors as an instance, there were four for every 100 chongbo in the plains area and three in the in-between and mountainous areas as of the end of 1974. The number of tractors will be raised to 10 to 12 by 1980. The tractors are produced at home from domestic raw materials.

Rice-planting machines which made their appearance fist in 1974 have been introduced into all paddy fields in 1975. Autumn harvesting will be completely mechanized within two or three years to come.

The assistance given by the state to the cooperative farms between 1964 and 1973 was 21.1 per cent of the total amount of investments in capital construction. The agricultural tax-in-kind which has been levied on the peasants was completely abolished between 1964 and 1966.

AN EDITORIAL COMMENT

UN Assembly Rebuffs Tyranny of the Minority

Time changes all things, some slower than others, and time in general has not been on the side of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Korea. Recent resolutions of the UN General Assembly bear ample witness.

For over thirty years, US troops have occupied the Korean peninsula, and for twenty five of those years their commanders have attempted to cloak that occupation with the respectability and aegis of the United Nations. Over 40,000 US troops remain, recently supplemented with the most advanced armaments, including "tactical" nuclear weapons in contravention of the original armistice accords, to strengthen Pak Jung Hi's 600,000 man army desperately seeking to "defend" themselves from a state one-third their own number, the DPRK.

In the past a far less representative UN General Assembly than that now sitting and a far less inclusive Security Council, with Taiwan, a chief ally of the U.S. tyranny of the minority, standing in for China, were participants and, with varying degrees of reluctance, accomplices in the grand design of the United States to replace Japanese hegemony in Korea with its own. The questionable legality—or rather the illegality—of various UN actions and resolutions of that bygone era has often been noted. Wilfred Burchett, for example, has observed that according to Article 107 of the UN Charter that body "has no competence in postwar settlements related to World War II," of which the Korean "settlement" of 1945 was one example.

While today the U.S. purports to regard General Assembly resolutions as expressive of sentiment only, if not the will of an alleged "tyranny of the majority," the sentiments of that much smaller and more tractable General Assembly of the early 1950s carried the weight of authoritative mandate, especially when engineered, as they usually were, with vigorous arm-twisting.

In the case of the notorious "Chinese aggression" resolution branding China an aggressor after parts of her own territory had already been attacked, D. F. Fleming recalls that the "extreme tactics used to force (it) through had employed everything in our arsenal of pressure weapons, short of steaming a couple of battleships up the East River and training them on the UN's new headquarters." (Vol. I, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, p. 632).

The whole UN participation in the Korean War was of an *ex post facto* nature: presented with a continuous series of *faits accomplis* by a power which enjoyed overwhelming military, political and economic influence throughout the capitals of the world, including numerous Central American republics, it is arguable that the UN of those days had little choice. US naval and other armed forces had already been committed, and the organization was called upon to sanctify a foregone conclusion—"North Korean aggression"—although its own observers had been absent from the fateful demarcation line for forty-eight hours at the time. And independent verification of the self-serving cries of North Korean attack was inherently impossible, nor was the North Korean version of events ever allowed a serious hearing, although from I. F. Stone to Gabriel Kolko and more recently, serious historians have demonstrated the possibility, if not the plausibility of South Korean provocation raids, particularly in light of previous statements and threats by Syngman Rhee, John Foster Dulles and other leaders.

Much of this important background was presented in the first issue of *Korea Focus*, vol 1 no 1 Fall 1971 which, taken together constitutes a damning and well documented brief for the contention that the UN was used in this whole horrible affair to serve the interest of US empire builders, rather than the Korean people or anybody else. In any event, "the finishing touch" as I. F. Stone put it, "was to make the United Nations forces subject to MacArthur without making MacArthur subject to the United Nations . . . the 'unified command'—

"He was not obliged to consult the United Na-

tions, nor to report to it, regularly or otherwise . . . the United Nations had given MacArthur his blank check." Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that the US's client states had agreed, after the necessary "leverage" was applied, to yield up their blank check to the lasting disgrace of the organization they purported to represent.

Since that infamous period the world has changed greatly, and the familiar assertions that the US stands only for justice and tranquility in the world are no longer accorded the reverential, awed reception they once were.

In *1973*, at the 28th General Assembly Session the old misnamed "UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" (UNCURK) was disbanded by a significant majority which recognized that it was doing little for either rehabilitation or unification, but was rather one more instrument in the US policy of keeping Korea divided and subject to foreign occupation.

In *1974*, the 29th General Assembly divided equally—51 to 51 with 38 abstentions, on the proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from Korean soil. It should not be forgotten that great US pressure was brought to bear in both these votes, as it was in more recent resolutions. The actions of the *1975 30*th General Assembly are therefore doubly significant. As the US has done in other similar situations when confronting the possibility of an unfavorable resolution, it sought to sponsor a "compromise" to avoid the sting of anything resembling public censure by the world majority, as it did in the motion to admit China to full membership.

In a apparent effort to bolster what appeared to be diminishing diplomatic support over the Korea question, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the General Assembly on September 22 that the USA is calling for a four-part conference, including North and South Korea, the US and China, to discuss alternate arrangements to the present armistice. However, both the DPRK and China refused to consider such a meeting. At a news conference two days later DPRK UN observer Kwon Min Jun said that the U.S. proposal "cannot become the subject of any discussion."

In this case, the US co-sponsored a motion to perpetuate the so-called "UN Command" in South Korea by dropping the UN flag and replacing it with its own flag and that of the Pak regime, its Korean protectorate, and continuing as before, with no steps toward effecting a final peace agreement, now twenty-two years delayed.

> U.S. scholar Linus Pauling in his answer to questions form "Choson Simbo" (a Korean daily published in Tokyo), in connection with the 30th session of UNGA declared that the "U.S. government's policy towards Korea has been wrong all for the past 30 years" and noted that "the recent talk of the U.S. authorities about the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula is one totally ignoring public opinion."
>
> Saying that "The Pak Jung Hi regime is a military dictatorial regime," he noted that the "world people know only too well" how viciously this military fascist "regime" is strangling human rights and democracy.
>
> He said that "could not repress indignation at the U.S. government which is supporting such fascist regimes."
>
> He expressed "active support to the North-South Joint Statement whose keynote is the three principles of independence, peaceful, reunification and great national unity." He remarked: "In order that this Joint Statement is carried into practice, the U.S. troops must be withdrawn from South Korea and a system under which the free expression of the people is fully ensured, the democratization of society must be realized in South Korea."
>
> He said:
>
> "A peace agreement must be concluded between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States and the U.S. troops must be withdrawn from South Korea without delay under this agreement."
>
> "If the North-South Confederation proposed by Presiden Kim Il Sung is instituted on this condition, this will be best and it will be the short-cut to reunification, I believe."

The US resolution would supposedly "designate military officers of the United States and the Republic of Korea as successors in command to ensure enforcement of all provisions of the Armistice Agreement now the responsibility of the United Nations Command, provided that the other parties directly concerned agree prior to termination that they will regard all provisions of the armistice as continuing its force." (The US knew perfectly well, of course, that there was no chance that the "other parties," China and the DPRK— the ROK was not a signatory—would so agree.) That resolution was approved 59 to 51 with 29 abstentions.

The other resolution, sponsored by Algeria and a number of "Third World" and socialist countries, called explicitly for a permament peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea,"the real parties to the Armistice Agreement," and urges the withdrawal of "all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations . . . urges the North and South of Korea to observe the principles of the North-

Ambassador Kwon Min Jon,
DPRK Permanent Observer to the U.N.

South Joint Statement (of July 4, 1972, of expressed support for independent, peaceful reunification, free of foreign interference—ed.) and take practical measures for ceasing arms reinforcement, reducing the armed forces of both sides drastically to an equal level, preventing armed conflicts and guaranteeing against the use of force against the other side, and thereby remove the military confrontation and maintain a durable peace in Korea, conducive to accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of the country." That resolution passed by 54 to 43 votes, with 42 abstentions.

US Ambassador D. P. Moynihan made it clear to the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly that the US would not feel bound by any UN resolution calling for the removal of its troops from South Korea. Speaking to the committee, Moynihan stated that the presence of 40,000 American troops in the ROK is none of its business and that the troops will remain there "as long as they are needed."

No nation voted for both resolutions, but the sense of the UN was clear: stop using the UN flag in Korea to perpetuate an inherently unstable situation. "On balance," as Michael Berlin wrote in the *New York Post*, "the North Koreans won. For the first time since the UN itself fought against them in the Korean war, the UN adopted a resolution they had proposed—(it was) the first time (the Pak regime) had failed to muster enough votes to prevent the North from scoring points at the UN, the institution that has always provided the Seoul regime with its legitimacy, and shielded it with the UN flag (at least symbolically). . . . Now the South Koreans have to worry about next year, when their resolution, whatever it might say, might not get adopted at all." (*NY Post*, 11/19/75)

The United States has lost another round in its never-ending battle to make a stalemate look like a peace, a peace recognized by the world community, as it seeks to legitimize the division of Korea and the rule of South Korea by dictator Pak Jung Hi. The Korean people and progressive humanity everywhere have edged one more step closer to a durable peace—not because of US strength, but in spite of it. One more nail in the coffin of the "US tyranny of the minority."

Verily, time changes all things.

D. B. B.



U.S. Ambassador Moynihan.

Secret Documents Expose 1950 Korean War Criminals

In the first issue of our publication, Korea Focus, published in 1971, we stated that "of the 49,000 cubic feet of classified documents, comprising 160 million pages, the estimate for the Korean War is 60 million pages. But is would take only a small portion of these millions of pages, when made public, to expose the lies, deceit and perfidy used by our statesman and military leaders to cover up the tragic events leading to the Korean War of 1950-53."

A trickle of the 60 million pages is beginning to see the light of day. We present one of these confidential and restricted documents recently made public in a Korean-American publication *The Voice of the People*. We quote from the introduction by the editor of the publication, Prof. Channing Liem, formerly Chief of the South Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations:

"WHO PROVOKED THE KOREAN WAR?"

"We present hereunder several documents which prove that South Korea in 1950 was anything but an innocent victim of North Korea's aggression. Our purpose in so doing is not to harp on the past and revive the memory of sorrow and bitterness. Rather, it is to help prevent recurrence of similar tragedy in the future by showing that before pulling the trigger one must remember that the aggressor may well be one's own 'friend.' Nowadays, more than ever before, when ther is no peace in the world but a precarious balance of nuclear terror, nations can resort to force out of blind prejudice only at their peril.

"If the Syngman Rhee government in 1950 felt compelled to provoke a war, the Park Chung Hee government today has for greater reason to feel the necessity for a second Korean War as the best insurance for its political life. Park is perfectly capable of staging an 'invasion on South Korea by the North.' In fact, we have received from responsible leaders in South Korea urgent pleas to warn the American people that their greatest fear is that Park may unleash a nuclear war."

—The Editor
(Prof. Channing Liem)

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Seoul

"RESTRICTED August 26, 1949
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Subject: Conversation with Colonel Kim Paek Il.

"On August 25th, I had dinner with the following officers of the Korean Army: Col. Kim Paek Il, Commandant of the School of Arms; Col. Min Ki Sik, Assistant Commandant of the School and recently returned from the Infantry School, Fort Benning; Col. SONG Yo Chan, Commander in Chejoo last year and now Commandant of Cadets at the School of Arms, and Lt. Col. Chung Chong Keun, Assistant G-3, KA Headquarters.

"Col. Kim laid some emphasis on the great sentiment existing in the Army for invasion of the North. He stated that the morale of the troops, especially of new troops, was generally very high but that this morale was based on the feeling that they were coming into the Army to get the job of unification done. The morale of those troops who had gone to the parallel with this feeling and had remained month after month digging foxholes and repelling attacks without being able to bring the attack to the enemy, had fallen off badly. Col. Kim stated that he felt 'that the troops needed about six months more training before being really prepared.' The implication of what they would be prepared for seemed understood by everyone.

"Col. Min, a bright, aggressive young officer, stated two things of some interest which appeared, from their reception in the group, to be not entirely down the official alley. 'One usually hears,' he said, 'that the Army never attacks North Korea and is always getting attacked. This is not true. Mostly our Army is doing the attacking first and we attack harder. Our troops feel stronger.' There was some slight protest in Ko-

rean against this remark accompanied with some blushes. Col. Min then said, in connection with some remarks on defections: 'Almost all our troubles come from the officers. Hardly one per cent of the enlisted men are disloyal. They know nothing. But they are easily led.'

(signed) GH
G. Henderson
Third Secretary

GHhenderson/df

Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington, D.C.

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency:

This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result.

I have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permisson for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle.

The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully Yours,
John M. Chang

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

* * *

Who Really Prepared, instigated and started the war Against North Korea in June 1950

September 30, 1949, Syngman Rhee, in a letter to a U.S. friend, Dr. Robert Oliber, stated:

"I am firmly convinced that this is the psychological best moment to resort to aggressive measures . . . we will drive Kim Il Sung's people into the hills and gradually starve them out there."

October 7, 1949, Syngman Rhee, in an interview with the United Press, boasted that the South Korean Army could take the North capital Pyongyang within three days.

October 19, 1949, at a divisional commander's conference in Seoul, General W. L. Roberts declared:

"Certainly, there have been many attacks on the territory north of the 38th parallel on mu orders, and there will be many others in the days to come. . . . From now on, the invasion by the land forces of the territory north of the 38th parallel is to be carried out only on the basis of orders of the American Military Mission."

Three months later the general was more precise and declared:

"The campaign against the north has been decided upon and the date for carrying it through is not very far off."

November 1, 1949, Syn Sung Mo, South Korean War Minister, declared according to the *New York Herald Tribune,* that his army was ready and waiting to push into communist North Korea.

April 28, 1950, The Melbourne Sun reports and address delivered by *New York Times* correspondent Richard Johnson to the Overseas Press Club:

"The South Koreans are frantic in their desire to attack North Korea. . . ."

June 5, 1950, The New York Herald Tribune reports an interview by Marguerite Higgins with Brigadier-General W. L. Roberts, Chief of the American Military Mission in Korea. The General described how 500 U.S. officers trained 100,000 South Korean soldiers. He declared:

"The American taxpayer had an army which was a fine watch-dog for the capital investments made in that country."

June 19, 1950. After John Foster Dulles, in an address to the South Korean Parliament, assured them that "the Communists will lose their rule over North Korea." Syngman Rhee followed him to the Speaker's podium and pronounced this threat of war:

John Foster Dulles inspects the border between North and South Korea in June 1950, one week before the outbreak of the Korean war.

"If we cannot defend democracy in the cold war, then we will achieve victory in a hot war."

June 20, 1950, The Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 5 days before the outbreak of war:

"There is no lack of people in South Korea who see the solution of the problems weighing heavily upon the country in a military attack on the north. The Americans have outfitted 150,000 men with American weapons, have put them under the command of American instructors and have long been preparing for war."

July 30, 1950. One month after the outbreak of war, an information officer on General MacArthur's staff declared to a press conference in the General's headquarters in Tokyo:

"When the war began on the 25th of June, the North Korean Army had not carried out its mobilization plan. Only six divisions were ready, although the North Korean plans call for 13 to 15 divisions in case of war."

The Korean Center for Intervention and Assassination (KCIA)

By DAVID B. BUEHRENS

One of the many results of the recent exposés of the U.S. CIA has been the attention directed to one of its many offspring, the secret police network of South Korea, a particularly vicious and nasty offspring at that, and a decisive factor in the survival of the Pak Jung-hi regime in that U.S. protectorate. When we look more closely at the policies and exploits of the KCIA, the family resemblance becomes unmistakeable, and the question of "legitimate" or adoptive parentage a moot one.

Wilfred G. Burchett, long a close observer and veteran reporter of the Korean scene, has put the Seoul agency in its appropriate context, as follows:

"Under Article V of the 'special law on punishing special crimes,' persons who communicate with anyone in the North may be jailed for up to seven years on charges of 'acting in the interest of anti-state organizations or communist circles outside the country.' On the political level, this precludes any form of North-South contact at any level between individuals or organizations for any purpose whatsoever; in human terms, it makes even North-South letter-writing between husband and wife, or parents and children a state crime. . . .

"Of course, the most heinous crime in President Pak's view is that of 'conducting agitation or propaganda for the purpose of overthrowing the government.' The 'special law on punishing specific crimes' condemns such offenders to a minimum of five years in prison and a mazimum of death. Under the same law, up to ten years in prison may be handed down to anyone inventing a 'lie' about the government, or anyone 'wittingly' spreading such a lie . . . permission to form any organization, group or circle must be obtained from the police; prior police approval must be had even to raise the question of a labor substitute. . . .

"To enforce such laws, a massive apparatus of repression and informers is obviously needed, In factories it is estimated there is one police agent for every 15 workers; in higher educational establishments, one for every eight students. Thirty-seven different intelligence organizations work at Seoul University. In terms of regular police per capita, the present regime has twice as many as the Japanese had at the height of their repressive rule in Korea, and three times as many as in the United States and Britain today. And Pak is planning to double the force within the next few years. That is regular police only. In the 10 sections of the Bureau of Internal Security of the Ministry of the Interior, directly under the control of U.S. advisers, there are 320,000 full-time paid police agents apart from the 40,000 regular police.

"Coordinating all intelligence activities is the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which is nominally under the direct control of Pak Jung-hi but in fact is subordinated to the Seoul branch of the American CIA. It has 15,000 staff members and 370,000 full-time agents."

(Wilfred Burchett, *Again Korea,* 1968, pps 157, 158.)

South Korea, in short, has become a country riddled with police agents, informers and goons, and a society at the mercy of the self-appointed few who control them. Under their authority—ultimately that of Pak Jung-hi, the KCIA has become a virtually invisible government under the lock-step rule of President Pak. . . . On a recent visit to Seoul, *Newsweek's* Bernard Krisher had a first-hand taste of the KCIA's tactics: "Everywhere I went, agents armed with walkie-

talkies shadowed me," cabled Krisher. "Koreans I had known for years suddenly cancelled interviews; others only spoke briefly—knowing that the longer they talked to me, the longer they would be grilled by the KCIA." *(Newsweek,* October 22, 1973)

According to Richard Halloran of the *New York Times,* the KCIA's "agents, often visible, are everywhere. No telephone is considered safe from tapping and no office, hotel room or even home free from electronics bugging. "They watch everything," an informed Korean said of the internal security division of the intelligence agency. "They have men in just about every other government office and the governments bureaucrats really must not irk the C.I.A. man there.' " Halloran terms the KCIA "quite clearly a secret police. It strikes at will, without warning or warrant, and is beyond the law and the courts." *(New York Times,* August 20, 1973)

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was founded after Pak Jung-hi came to power in 1961, and its first director, Kim Jong Pil, was a key participant in that military seizure of power. A former director, Lee Hu Rak, is one of Pak's closest advisers—like many of the organization's staff and personnel, he has a military background and served for years as a military attaché in the Korean embassy in Washington.

The KCIA has eight operational bureaus, which span a wide range of activities, both domestic and foreign. Their functions are as follows: the first bureau is devoted to recruiting, trining, personnel, administrative functions, and the collection of foreign data published abroad.

The "cultural affairs" bureau has charge of domestic propaganda and anti-communist indoctrination; it posts its agents in each newspaper and broadcasting station. (The counter-intelligence bureau takes care of rounding up "infiltrators," "spies" and "subversives," who often appear synonymous.)

Another bureau is authorized to "watch" government institutions, offices, banks, businesses, labor unions, military units, artistic and cultural associations. "Its network," writes Halloran, "is so extensive that the agency once put a telephone call through from Seoul to a noodle shop in the remote countryside where an American visitor had wandered on a holiday without telling anyone." The same bureau also exercises final determination on the granting of passports for South Koreans who apply to travel abroad. This policy,



similar to that of the late Thieu government in Vietnam, has not, one might observe, generated any perceptible movement in Congress for restrictions on the U.S. aid program for the Seoul regime, which is still very large. But perhaps Senator Jackson would not see the connection.

Still another bureau of the KCIA has charge of dirty tricks, provocations, sabotage and assassinations—what are euphemistically termed "clandestine" or "covert activities" by spokesmen for the U.S. CIA. This is the bureau which is charged with organizing and executing abductions and assassinations in foreign countries.

A sixth bureau is responsible for the acquisition and processing of foreign intelligence, and operates in every South Korean embassy. Another bureau, formerly part of this one, concentrates

entirely on DPRK affairs.

Finally, an eighth bureau functions as a psychological warfare unit, mostly against the DPRK, and carries out leaflet drops, radio and loudspeaker broadcasting, and "rumor spreading," described elsewhere as "black propaganda" or "disinformation." One can readily understand the affinity of this CIA for its American big brother, with which it keeps "liaison," in the delicate phrasing of Halloran, and after which it was originally "patterned," according to *Newsweek*, and other western journalists. (The nature of that liaison will be explored further in a later article on the U.S. CIA, based on the Philip Agee exposé and other recent information.)

But it is the field of foreign operations that the KCIA has become increasingly visible—like a skin cancer which continues to spread its virulent infection.

"The South Korean CIA (KCIA) engages in surveillance and intimidation of Korean scholars and students at many major academic centers int eh U.S., depriving them of their freedom of speech in the U.S.and their knowledge and insights." (Prof. Jerome A. Cohen, *"Christianity and Crisis"*—Aug. 18, 1975)

According to a recent Jack Anderson column, "the Justice Dept. is quietly investigating charges that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), modeled after our own embattled spy agency, has terrorized Korean exiles in (this) country, has set up illegal front groups to manipulate U.S. public opinion and has even tried to 'buy off' U.S. Congressmen." *(New York Post*, July 17, 1975.)

Anderson goes on to detail the "buy-off" charges from a former South Korean official, Dr. Jai Hyon Lee, "director of information for South Korea in this country in the early 1970's," who has since apparently defected. Lee's charge, confirmed by a former State Department director of Korean affairs, concerned "a scheme of clandestine operations" designed "to mute criticism of (President) Pak's totalitarianism and to buy off its supporters in the U.S." Lee testified that the Korean ambassador was in charge of the operation, accounting for a recent doubling of the number of KCIA agents at the Washington embassy. Lee warned that "Pak's KCIA arm is . . . stretched into the U.S., illegally manipulating American institutions and intimidating Korean residents in the country." More specifically, he accused the KCIA of intimidating U.S. businessmen with Korean interests, financing pro-Pak activities in the U.S., and organizing front-groups to propagandize on behalf of the Seoul regime.

The widely publicized campaigns of the "Reverend" Sun Myung Moon come immediately to mind, of course, as we have seen in a previous article in *Korea Focus*. A pro-Pak seminar in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in 1972; a Washington conclave in 1973, a June 1975 Washington rally, the Korean newspaper Hankook Shinmoon, a Korean radio-TV broadcasting station in Washington, and "various Korean associations in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City and San Francisco," were all fingered by Dr. Lee, now a professor at Western Illinois University, as mouthpieces of the KCIA.

Lee also described the silencing of outspoken Korean residents by threats against their relatives and friends in Korea, and told interviewers that "KCIA operatives are even extorting money from Korean residents" on the West Coast. "These Korean residents are so afraid of KCIA reprisal that they do not dare report to the police."

According to Anderson, "the Justice Dept. . . . is trying to determine whether the KCIA has violated any U.S. laws," which is a little like the Rockefeller Commission "trying to determine whether the U.S. CIA has behaved illegally. The question is not if, but when, where, how, how often and how long.

According to an AP report of August 30, 1975:

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating charges that South Korean intelligence agents are harassing Korean-American critics of Pak Jung-hi.

A Justice Department official told a congressional subcommittee that up to eight Korean Central Intelligence (KCIA) operatives were asked to leave the United States for such harassment two years ago.

John Salzberg, the subcommittee's counsel, said the official told him the bureau is investigating new charges by a former Korean Embassy attache that Korean-American critics of Pak Jung-hi are still being intimidated.

The former attache, Dr. Lee Jai Hyon said in June 1973, that KCIA agents across the country spied on and harassed Korean-Americans and broke up at least two anti-Pak rallies.

The State Department expressed concern at the time and Salzberg said the Justice official has now told him a federal investigation led to requests for five to eight KCIA agents to leave the

United States.

Lee told the subcommittee this year that the harassment by KCIA agents is still going on. . . .

Lee testified that Korean community associations in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles are still being manipulated by singling out and intimidating dissident members."

In recent months the "New Korea" a Los Angeles based newspaper, has been the object of "subtle but brutal retaliation" by the ROK counsel general in L.A. and KCIA "notorious" operatives because of the newspapers' independent editorial policies, according to editor Kim Woon Ha.

Kim declared that "South Korean dictator Pak Jung-hi's acts of violence and repression of human rights are not limited to South Korea." Kim charged that the ROK's CIA-diplomats are attempting to discredit the paper and undermine it financially as they did the prestigious paper, "Dong A Ilbo," in South Korea. They are pressuring Los Angeles businessmen to cut off all advertising. One company, Korean Airlines, has already done so. Kim claims a $10,000 loss in revenues since the KCIA-diplomat harassment began.

On June 12, 1975, Rep. Donald Fraser, chairman of the Panel, International Organizations Subcommittee, told the House of Representatives:

"Dr. Li makes a number of serious charges regarding activities by the Korean CIA within the U.S.

"In particular, he alleges that the KCIA harasses and intimidates Koreans and Korean-Americans who are critical of the present South Korean government.

"He alleges that the South Korean government covertly funds a number of front organizations and activities here in the U.S. in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

"He alleges that the (South Korean) Ambassador has attempted to 'buy off' members of Congress. These charges, I believe, should be thoroughly investigated by the Department of Justice."

In Japan, too, the KCIA is active, as one might suspect in a country where 600,000 Korean exiles, most of them foes of Pak's regime, make their home. As the Japanese weekly journal *Shukan Gendei* has reported, "In the South Korean embassy and consulate in Japan there are many

Korean pickets protest activities of Pak's CIA.

special agents, including those of CIA director-level, under the name of Consul, deputy consul and secretary, and agents are posted everywhere, including the South Korea-lined companies and restaurants, and there are more than 250 intelligence agents in the Kanto district alone. . . . The duty of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency is outwardly to take steps against 'spies' and undertaken 'anti-communist' operations. But, in fact, it is the veiled body of the Pak regime (intended) to suppress all those who wage an 'anti-government' movement on charges of being communists."

An example of their activity was the seizure and brutal beating in Seoul of the son of a prominent Korean real estate dealer, Yang Pan San, in Tokyo, on the grounds that the father was engaged in "the reunification movement in Tokyo."

Another example was the kidnapping from *West Germany* back to South Korea, of an internationally known composer, Yun In Sang, after the latter had expressed his displeasure with Pak's benevolent policies. After international protest was organized Yun was allowed to return to West Germany where he announced that "I did not like to continue having a passport issued by the brutal government which violently kidnapped me and tortured me for two years, but still I am a

South Korean." (*Asaki Evening News* (Japan), 9/25/73)

The most notorious exploit was probably the abduction from Tokyo of Kim Dae Jung, Pak's opponent in the 1971 presidential election, from his hotel room in Tokyo, August 8, 1973, back to Seoul. After two years of being under house arrest, he was finally framed, convicted and sentenced on December 13, 1975, to a prison term for so-called election law "violations" and for "false" accusations against dictator Pak Jung-hi.

This case is fairly well known,* but that of Professor Tsche Chong Kil, a legal scholar and graduate of Harvard Law School, is less well known. When Tsche returned to Seoul in the fall of 1972, President Pak's new "charter" replacing the constitution with one-man rule was protested by peaceful student demonstrations which drew the wrath of the KCIA. "In one such incident" in 1973, we learn, "KCIA thugs beat up and arrested some (Seoul National University) law students, a professor and the associate dean. This was too much for even Prof. Tsche, who in earlier years had sought to pacify student unrest. He protested against the KCIA's action at a meeting of the law faculty. Shortly after class on October 16, 1973, Tsche was picked up by the KCIA. He was never seen alive again.

Four days later the government announced that Tsche had been arrested for investigation of charges of spying for North Korea and that after making a confession he had committed suicide by jumping out the seven-floor window of an interrogation. . . . The fact that Tsche's widow, a medical doctor, was denied permission to examine his corpse hardly inspires confidence in what appears to have been a hastily contrived story." (Jerome Alan Cohen, "A Grim Anniversary in South Korea," *Washington Post*, October 9, 1974)

According to the same account by Professor Cohen, an Asian scholar, the stories of Kim Dae Jung and Professor Tsche are "not unique. The exquisite tortures that have become the KCIA's hallmark have claimed many victims. Its mindless arrogance recognizes no bounds but power. . . . Yet this is only to speak of Koreans who are well known or who have foreign friends to inquire after them. There are countless others."

Because of the KCIA's record of numerous provocations and set-up operations, it has been widely speculated that the recent assassination attempt on President Pak, if that is what it was, was also a KCIA job. Questions have naturally been raised about how an armed man managed to get so close to the generally heavily guarded South Korean dictator. Moon, the gunman, was supposed to have come from Japan to South Korea only shortly before the attempt, which makes it certain that he was checked by the Korean CIA and Seoul passport control officials, who as we have seen, carry out KCIA functions. (The Voice of the Korean People, a non-Communist newsletter published in English and Korean in New Paltz, N.Y., revealed a whole list of disturbing discrepancies in the official account of the "assassination" attempt, in its issue of September 1, 1974).

Certainly the assassination attempt was a very opportune occasion for Pak to clamp down still harder on domestic dissent, and once again point an accusing finger at the DPRK to divert attention from the increasing repression and hardship at home.

The cry of anti-communism has served that purpose very well in the past in South Korea, just as it did under Syngman Rhee's rule, and there is every indication that it will continue to do so. After all, isn't the primary function of the KCIA, like that of its parent organization, to protect a ruling stratum from the critical, knowledgeable scrutiny of its own citizens, and not to shield them from any real threat from abroad?

Below we present some "testimonials" to the KCIA from some of its victims and comments about effects of KCIA performances.

The South Korean economic attaché in Bonn, Kim Soon Tai resigned his post and wants to stay in West Germany because he fears "torture and eventual death" at the hands of KCIA on his return to Seoul, a report from West Germany said on Aug. 28, 1975.

Kim said, on Aug. 26, he had resigned "in a most emphatic protest against the wanton destruction of the democratic system by the military-backed totalitarian dictatorship regime of Seoul, the report said, and continued:

Kim was due to return to Seoul after a three-year tour of duty here but failed to turn up at Bonn Airport where other embassy staffs were waiting to see him off.

Kim said on Aug. 26 he had learned from "reliable sources" in Seoul that his life would be in danger if he returned, because of his past criticisms of the South Korean regime of Pak Jung-hi.

He and his wife and three children have remained in their flat here since last week because Kim fears "a kidnap plot by embassy and the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)."

Kim said he had informed the West German Foreign

* For a full account of the kidnapping see Korea Focus, Vol. 2, No. 3, Jan.-Feb. 1974—"Watergate Plumbers in Seoul."

Ministry here of his decision to resign but had not yet asked for political asylum.

He had also asked the ministry and police for protection after noticing "suspicious activity" around his Rhineside apartment block. He would not elaborate.

Kim said he had sent a letter to South Korean Embassy charge d'affaires Myung Ha Chang on Aug. 21 and telephoned him the same day to inform him of his resignation.

"Mr. Chang came to my home and spent six hours trying to persuade me to change my mind," Kim said. When asked whether the chargé d'affaires had made any threats, Kim said this was the case but refused to give details.

He said he feared a similar kidnap to one in 1967 when 17 South Koreans were mysteriously spirited from West Germany by the KCIA and were later found to be in South Korean jails.

From the testimony on May 22, 1975, of the Rev. James P. Sinnott, who was expelled from South Korea, by the Korean CIA:

"My special concern at first was the manipulation of the churches into supporting all Pak's dictatorial decisions.

"Pak tried hard to get active support of the more gullible and more purchaseable of the churchmen. . . .

"In church is where most Koreans learn a little bit about their government, and because they learn a bit of this truth, the church becomes a high priority enemy of the regime.

"It is said that Pak has the support of the rural population. The truth, however, is that he has a firmer grip on them."

* * *

According to a report from Duisburg, on June 7, about 500 South Koreans working at coal mines in the Ruhr staged a demonstration against the KCIA agents who watch, oppress and kidnap them.

The demonstrators denounced the Pak puppet clique, demanded guarantee, of democratic rights, freedom and human rights.

The West German news agency reported that the struggle of the south Korean colliers was supported by the West German people.

At present in West Germany there are 13,000 South Koreans including colliers, nurses and students.

The coal miners exposed CIA kidnap attempts against the militant leaders of the defiant miners. Charges made by South Koreans are that they are always under surveillance by the agents.

* * *

The South Korean authorities' announcement of the "accidental hiking death" of Chang Jun Ha, 57, a leading public figure, was a downright lie.

Chang Chun Ha, regarded by many as one of the few uncorrupted politicians still active in ROK, was probably murdered on August 17, 1975. Although the government maintains that Chang was the victim of a hiking accident (Chang was an experienced mountain climber) friends and relatives remain gravely suspicious because of the contradictions in accounts of the alleged accident.

A courageous intellectual, Chang Jun Ha was reported to have died on August 17 while climbing a mountain. But reliable sources are convinced he was, in fact, killed by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

These reliable sources stated that there were no scars or bruises on his body except a huge lump on his head behind the right ear—this is contradictory to the announcement by the Pak Jung Hi authorities.

By the time his family was notified and reached the site, it was closely guarded by the Korean CIA and police and journalists were prevented from inspecting it. Friends returning to the site a week later found no signs of strain on the tree which was supposed to have broken.

Medical examination showed that Chang Chun Ha died from a concussion at the base of his skull behind the right ear, but the body showed no signs of having fallen 40 feet onto jagged rocks. His body in general, ear and hands were undamaged, his sunglasses and the thermos bottle in his knapsack were intact, and his clothes were neither torn nor dirty.

An independent witness, who for obvious reasons must remain anonymous, says Chang was beaten to death by five young men 100 meters away from the spot where his body was found.

A *Dong-A Ilbo* reporter Son Pak O who wrote about the discrepancies in the account of Chang's death was at once arrested when his story appeared. (But later released) The family of the deceased are under KCIA orders not to talk about his death.

Chang Chun Ha had been released from prison earlier this year, when his jailers certified that he would not live more than a few months and should be allowed to die at home. When his health began to improve, one of the prison officials was fired. Under constant surveillance and deprived of civil rights, he nonetheless resumed political activity. Five days before his death he had met with Kim Dae Jung, and it is believed they had discussed launching a new movement to change the present constitution.

A dedicated Korean nationalist, Chang founded *Sasanggye* (World of Thought), South Korea's leading literary monthly, in 1953. The journal was closed by government pressure in May 1970 for printing Kim Chi Ha's poem "Five Bandits."

In 1962 Chang was awarded the Magsaysay Award, and in 1967 he was elected to the National Assembly while serving a prison term for allegedly defaming the president. He was one of the leading organizers of the Constitution Revision Movement campaign begun in December 1973, which in two weeks gathered 400,000 signatures on a petition to reverse Pak's 1972 constitutional changes. Pak Jung-Hi's response was to declare a state of emergency and issue Emergency Decree No. 1, making it illegal to defame the Constitution or to petition for its revision. Chang was arrested on January 13, 1974 and two days later sentenced to 15 years in prison. Although Emergency Decree No. 1 was lifted in August 1974, prisoners sentenced under it were not released. Its provisions have now been included in Emergency Decree No. 9.

Chang Chun Ha played a historical role in furthering Korean national consciousness both during World War II and the post-war period. His death, with its contradictory and unexplained circumstances, reveals the condi-

tions of the time in which he lived.

* * *

The notorious South Korean Central Intelligence Agency is now again active abroad. Particularly, the United States and West Germany, their major hunting grounds.

According to a press report from Washington, the number of KCIA agents has increased two times in the United States, and the agents are conducting illegal acts here.

This was disclosed by South Korean Associate Professor of Journalism at Western Illinois University, Lee Jai Hyon, on June 10th at the hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Mr. Lee was a former director of the South Korean information center in the U.S.A. But he quit and sought asylum there, protesting aginst the Pak regime's suppression.

Nine instances of the illegal acts by KCIA were cited by the witness: (Congressional Record, 6/10/75)

1. To bribe key figures in the American Congress and the business community who are closely linked with South Korea through the Korean war and economic dealings. This was almost entirely left to the Ambassador.
2. To pressure the management of U.S. enterprises investing in South Korea to influence Congress and the Administration in support of Pak's policies.
3. To bribe the U.S.-South Korea economic cooperative bodies like the Commerce Council in New York, to issue statements in support for the Pak regime.
4. To compel the resident South Korean intellectuals and scholars in the U.S.A. and the American scholars in South Korea and Southeast Asian countries to support the Pak regime in return for the generous grants and invitations by the government for trips to South Korea.
5. To neutralize public criticism of the Pak regime by providing funds for academic institutions.
6. To influence and spread news favorable to Pak Jung Hi through the pro-Seoul American press.
7. To provide money for the Korean language programs on TV and radio stations, trying to influence the South Korean residents with pro-Pak propaganda.
8. To infiltrate the Korean community and the anti-Pak movement.
9. To intimidate and blackmail the reluctant Korean residents, relatives and friends to continue support and cooperation with the Pak regime.

Lee Jae Hyon added that these secret activities were jointly organized by the South Korean ambassador to Washington and the chief of the KCIA in the United States (like the U.S.-CIA and U.S. Ambassadors operate in foreign countries). Their activities cover all the 50 states.

Lee flatly denied the so-called "threat from North Korea." He insisted that there is no likelihood that the DPRK "will attempt to invade the south."

* * *

Blacklist: Seventy foreigners, including 24 Americans, are on an alleged South Korean CIA "blacklist" published in the September 25 issue of *Shukan Gendei,* a Japanese weekly.

The blacklist, dated May 29, 1974, divides the "enemies" of South Korea into three categories: "A" (strongly anti-government individuals who have shown no signs of repentence), "B" (anti-government individuals who have not repented), and "C" (those who have done some anti-government activities but who may show signs of repentance).

The list included Dr. Edwin Reischauer, Harvard professor and former Ambassador to Japan, and Tokyo-based correspondents for the following publications: The *New York Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal* and *Christian Science Monitor.*

Also included are American Christian leaders: Dr. Edwin Fisher (B), Asia mission secretary for the United Methodist Board of Global Ministries; the Rev. Ed. Luidens (C), Division of Overseas Ministries staff for the NCCC/USA.

Nicola Geiger and Bernard Wideman, a journalist and former Fulbright Scholar, deported from ROK last year, are also on the list.

* * *

From the testimony on June 12, 1975 of Leonard C. Meeker, former legal advisor to the State Department and currently a member of the Center For Law and Social Policy in Washington:

"What we see in South Korea is not prudent defense.

"It is the operation of a police state which brands any non-conformity, or dissent as treason.

"The U.S. actions are not neutral in relation to the internal political situation. They are shoring up a dictatorship.

"The U.S. is not thereby strengthening security in that country . . . South Korea should cease to be a dark and forbidding prison."

* * *

From the testimony of Donald L. Renard, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs of the State Department, 1970-1974:

"(South) Korea today is under the leadership of a government more un-democratic than any since Korea was liberated from the Japanese in 1945.

"The best way to summarize the status of human rights in (South) Korea today, is simply to say that, for all practical purposes, there are none.

"There is no reason for the assignment of (Korean) CIA to any American city. . . .

"Why should the expression of conviction regarding human rights be such an agonizing experience for our State Department?

"If there is one lesson we should have learned from Korea, it is that her people will not endure forever a government which denies them a right to participate.

"Unless the present course of events is arrested or reversed, there will be trouble in (South) Korea. . . .

"No public institution is secure in (South) Korea from the inclusion of a powerful and ruthless government.

"And this includes the church . . . church buildings and files have been violated on several occasions, and its personnel similarly infiltrated by intelligence operators from the KCIA."

Who is Pak Jung Hee?

By JOHN HITZ

The thread that runs through the life of Pak Jung-Hi US/puppet Pesident of South Korea, is opportunism. It is seen even in the three names he has assumed during his career. His correct Korean name is Pak Jung-hi; when he became a lieutenant in the Japanese army in 1945 he changed his name to the Japanese "Minoru Okamoto;" and, in order to make things easier for his American associates, he insisted in the early 1960's that he be referred to as Chung-Hee Park.

Pak Jung-hi was born on September 3, 1917 in North Kyongsang Province in south-eastern Korea. He was the youngest son of Pak Song Bin, a peasant who had collaborated with the Japanese, during a peasant uprising and had been named headman of Nyongwol county. Pak Jung-hi attended a normal school in Taegu and graduated in 1937, at which time he became a teacher at the Mungyong Primary School in his home province.

In 1940 he applied to and was accepted as a cadet in the Manchukuo Military Academy, a training school for Japanese officers in Manchuria, a Japanese colony since 1931. He was so anxious to be accepted at the school that he cut his finger and wrote a pledge to "His Majesty the Emperor" of Japan in his blood. He was one of only 12 Koreans at the school, most of his classmates being Japanese, Chinese, and White Russians. But he proved himself to be an outstanding student and in 1942 was graduated and sent for further training to the Japanese Imperial Military Academy in Japan.

After his graduation from there in April 1944, he was sent as a sub-lieutenant to fight with the Japanese army in Manchuria, against the Chinese

Unholy trio: Kissinger, Ford and Pak.

and Korean communists and other anti-imperialists. In July 1945, one month before the end of the Pacific War, he was promoted to full lieutenant and company commander. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Pak was sent from China to Korea aboard a U.S. ship.

Upon returning to Korea, Pak went into seclusion until the fall of 1946, when he infiltrated the South Korean Workers' Party, a progressive force which wanted to unify Korea under a socialist government. He either did this as an agent of U.S. intelligence or because he saw the Party as a vehicle for his personal ambition; it is clear from his later actions that he never accepted the Party's goals or ideology. In September 1946, he entered the "Military Academy of the National Defense Garrison" in South Korea, and graduated in December 1946 as a captain. He was assigned to the 8th regiment, based in Chunchon, near the 38th parallel in central Korea, as an operations staff officer.

In November 1947 he was promoted to the operations staff of the South Korean Army headquarters. In early 1948 he became an instructor at the Military Academy. All Pak's advancement in the military took place when the South Korean Army was under the command of U.S. officers. Pak's rapid rise in the South Korean Army was complemented by his advantageous marriage to Yuk Yong Su in 1948 (recently shot and killed by a sniper). Yuk Yong Su was the daughter of a pro-Japanese feudal noble and had been an employee of a U.S. military officer.

One of the crucial episodes in the life of Pak Jung-Hi took place in October 1948. In that month a revolt took place in the South Korean Army, specifically in the 14th regiment stationed in Ryosu and Sunchon, southwestern Korea. The revolt was led by progressive officers and enlisted men who had been ordered to put down a popular uprising on Cheju Island in protest against the separate election of May 1948. This separate election (for South Korea only) was called by Syngman Rhee to keep himself, his clique, and U.S. imperialism in power in South Korea. It violated the deep aspirations of masses of Koreans for the unity of their country, North and South, and signalled the intention of the forces of imperialism to keep the country permanently divided.

The army mutiny was joined by the 6th Regiment in Masan and the 4th Regiment in Kwangju, also in the far south of Korea. The revolt was quickly put down, and 72 officers were arrested. Among them was Pak Jung-Hi, named as the "prime mover" of the rebellion. But strangely enough, the trial of the 72 ended with 71 officers receiving sentences ranging from 15 years at penal servitude to death, and one officer, Pak Jung-Hi, being given a discharge from the army. This had happened because Pak had provided the South Korean government with the names of members of the South Korean Workers' Party within the armed forces.

His information not only led to the imprisonment and death of 71 high-ranking officers, but to similar fates for 650 lower-ranking officers and 1,000 enlisted men. And most important, his testimony ensured that the opposition to the pro-imperialist regime of Syngman Rhee would remain weak and without a base in the armed forces. Pak informed on his fellow officers either to save his own skin or because he had been working for U.S. intelligence services all along. The latter explanation seems more likely, due to his subsequent rapid rise within the armed forces, his lifelong pattern of siding with whoever seems to be the strongest, and his connections with U.S. intelligence through his wife.

Pak was allowed to join the army reserve after his "trial" and was called to active duty as a major when the Korean War began in 1950. He was head of the first section of the army intelligence corps, and in September 1950 he became a lieutenant-colonel. Then he became, in succession, chief of special task corps, chief of staff of a division, and chief of an army artillery corps. The U.S. sent Pak to the U.S. Army Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1954, and when he returned to Korea he became head of the South Korean Artillery School. By November 1954, he was a brigadier general and in May 1955 he became commander of the 5th Division of the South Korean Army. In March 1957, Pak became Assistant Commander of the 6th Army Corps, and after his promotion to major general in March 1958 was named Chief of Staff of the First Army Command, then Commander of the 6th Military District (June 1959), and Commander of the Pusan Logistics Base (January 1960).

During the late 1950's the struggle of the South Korean people against the regime of Syngman Rhee intensified, and with students and youth in the leadership of the rebellion, he was overthrown on April 19, 1960. Chang Myon (John Chang) took over the government. He tried to

introduce some half-hearted reforms, but his regime was just as corrupt as Rhee's and he was unable to suppress the growing sentiment towards dialogue with the North. Pak Jung-Hi began to see the handwriting on the wall, and with his penchant for being "on the winning side," he tried to position himself, undoubtedly with U.S. help, to take advantage of the restlessness within the military.

In July 1960, he was transferred from Pusan in the far south to become Commander of the First Military District, then Assistant Commander of the Second Army, both posts being in the north of South Korea, near Seoul, the seat of power. On May 1, 1961, he was transferred to ROK Army Headquarters in Seoul, and on May 16, 1961, took over the government by a coup d'etat. The U.S. government made loud noises about how democracy had been violated, but the U.S. Central intelligence Agency knew what was going on. Allen Dulles said in a BBC interview on May 3, 1964 that the most successful activity of the CIA abroad during his term of office was the South Korean "military revolution."

Immediately after the coup, 23 political parties, 238 social organizations, and more than 900 press organs were disbanded. Thousands were arrested and detained. Two members of the United Socialist Party, which called for unification of Korea, as well as many other progressive minded people, were killed. The Korean Central Intelligence Bureau was set up under the direction of Kim Jong Pil, the husband of a niece of Pak Jung-Hi, and South Korea became even more of a police state than it was under Syngman Rhee.

Pak soon set about restoring relations with Japan, the renewal of ties with his old masters being one of his great ambitions. The opposition to renewal of economic ties with Japan was fierce and Pak declared martial law to suppress demonstrations against the South Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965. The control that Japan along with the U.S. exercises over the South Korean economy today has been well documented in the pages of *Korea Focus*, and it is the fruit of the 1965 treaty.

Other aspects of life in South Korea under Pak Jung-Hi have also been widely documented; for example his favoring of landlords over peasants in agricultural policy, the starvation wages in industry, the large scale arrests of even mild opposition leaders, the intransigence in talks with the North, the paranoid anti-communism, the continuation of over 40,000 U.S. troops on Korean soil, the sending of 50,000 troops plus 10,000 other personnel to fight for the U.S. in Vietnam, the endemic prostitution (ask any U.S. soldier who has been to Korea) and the all-pervading corruption. Regarding corruption, we would remember that one of the goals of the "military revolution" of Pak Jung-Hi was its elimination. *Newsweek* magazine wrote on November 20, 1961:

"Park is a genuine reformer. His ruling passion is to root out inefficiency and corruption to bring order to his country, which had become a 'thieves' den' ";

In testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Gulf Oil Chairman Bob R. Dorsey stated on May 16, 1975 that Gulf had paid $4 million to Pak's political party between 1966 and 1970 to protect its $300 million investment there. He further stated that the amount demanded had originally been $10 million, that Gulf had been subjected to "severe pressure," and that in his opinion the $4 million "made the difference" in Pak's narrowly-won reelection in 1971.

Need any more be said?

Operation Exodus

The post-Vietnam crisis is reflected in many ways in South Korea. Some of the symptoms are mounting complaints among soldiers against the Pak puppet regime's corruption and increasing number of deserters; emergence of a new anti-dictatorship movement, student struggle in the puppet court against fascist trials; and underground students' movements.

Despite Presidential "Emergency Decree No. 9," banning emigration of the rich and overseas shipment of their assets, the privileged circles are desperately trying to flee abroad, disguising themselves as tourists, with the objective of taking out their illegal assets from South Korea.

At the Blue House (Presidential Office) in Seoul, operations are being developed by Pak's aides for such an exodus. Leading the pack, like rats from a damaged ship with leaking holes, in

addition to Pak, the ringleaders include Li Hu Rak, former director of the KCIA; Pak Jong Gyu, former "security chief for the President"; and Yun Pil Yon, former commander of the "Seoul Special City Security Command."

In fourteen years since his capture of power, Pak Jung Hi has illegally accumulated enormous wealth.

According to a report from Tokyo, as part of Operation Plan Exodus, Pak purchased 400,000 pyong of land (one pyong is six feet square) in the Nasu District, Tochigi Prefecture, Japan.

He reportedly used the name of a Korean resident in Japan to conceal this land deal. He instructed the Tokyo branch of the Hanguk Foreign Exchange Bank to give certification of payment ot the Fixed Property Bank of Japan to "loan out" a huge amount of money to Chong Gon Yong, Chairman of "Tong Song Hoe," a terrorist organization operating in Japan.

It is a well known secret in New York that Pak owns the "Arirang House" Restaurant in midtown New York, and the Waikiki Resort Hotel in Hawaii. Pak has purchased a magnificent villa in Miami estimated at about $5 million.

In a bid to safeguard all his assets and guarantee that they are safely taken out of South Korea, $200 million was set aside for this operation.

The Commander in charge of this operation is Pak Jong Gyu. Though he resigned as security chief in connection with the assassination attempt on Pak, he still actually operates behind the scenes.

About ten high ranking puppet officials are involved in the operation, among them secretaries of the Presidential office, officials of the Finance and Industry Departments, the President of the Hanguk Foreign Exchange Bank and officials of Samsong and Zangin Zaibatzu corporations. This Exodus flight operation is classified as "blue" and "yellow" to designate the escape routes.

On top of the Blue House, large size helicopters, recently increased from three to five, are ready to fly at any moment.

According to "Operation A", the helicopters will immediately fly to the Osan U.S. Air Force Base. The contents is then to be transferred to a "Boeing 707" owned by Pak Jong Hi. After that the Boeing will leave for the U.S. AFB in Japan.

"Operation B" will become effective in case the Boeing 707 is not available, the helicopters carrying gold bullion will fly to Inchon where a 1,000-ton freighter is anchored. This freighter will leave for Shimonoseki a port in Japan.

In addition, the Korean air line is to carry gold bars stored in the big underground vault of the hanguk Bank to the Swiss Discont Bank in Zurich.

For the purpose of this operation Pak secretly dispatched missions to Japan, the U.S., West Germany, France and Switzerland, asking the governments of these countries to cooperate in helping him to transport his loot. These missions went disguised as economic, cultural and scientific delegations during international conferences. However, most of these countries refused to cooperate with Pak's request and now Pak has to depend entirely on the agreement of the Japanese government, which is closely allied with the Pak regime.

A Czarist Throwback Cries Out for Destruction of World

By MICHAEL MEYERSON

A stock character in every cartoonist's book is the bearded crackpot on the streetcorner carrying a sandwich-board sign, reading "Beware, the end of the world is near," or some such variation. One such variation in the real world is Alexander Solzhenitsyn who calls *for* the end of the world.

But for such lunacy he is rewarded not with the characterization of crackpot, but as a "voice for freedom." How else explain the accolades for this Czarist throwback, as at a recent AFL-CIO testimonial dinner in Washington D.C. when he offered, among other assorted ravings, the following:

Now we hear voices in your country and in the West: Give up Korea and we will live in peace.

In Korea, in 1950, you stood up against the Communists by your firmness and unyieldingness. And there was no world conflict."

Now, it might come as a surprise to one who looks back with longing on the colonial barbarism of the Romanoffs, but Korea is not "ours" to "give

up." Korea belongs to the Koreans, and at least north of the 38th parallel that nation is run of, by and for the Korean people. Mr. Solzhenitsyn, like his sponsors in Washington, apparently fears that some day the southern part of Korea will eliminate the economic, political and military grip of the United States and Japan. (Perhaps not Japan, for Solzhenitsyn is a champion only of "the West.")

He had condemned the Leninist policy of the Soviet Union of the right of nations, particularly in Soviet Asia, to self-determination. Solzhenitsyn holds that the peoples of the East are inferior, and a burden for "Great Russia," not unlike that other honored writer in colonialism's cause, Rudyard Kipling.

If one is to grant this man his honesty—which we do only for polemical purposes—one must also say he is a psychopath, for only a madman believes "there was no world conflict" in Korea in 1950-53. It is one thing for Solzhenitsyn to believe the United Nations is a Communist plot; it is another to deny its existence, or more specifically to deny that numerous NATO and SEATO nations sent troops to support the made-in-USA regime of Syngman Rhee in those years.

Undoubtedly Solzhenitsyn is saddened that MacArthur was not allowed to bomb China (and even his own country which he claims to love) but U.S. agression was provocative enough to the countries of socialism to bring tens of thousands of men, materiel and all other support necessary to the survival of the socialist Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

We must also consider the audience to which Solzhenitsyn spit out his warnings: the AFL-CIO bureaucracy—a CIA bedpartner in its foreign dealings—and the most rabid cold warriors and anti-semites in the Senate, James Buckley of New York and Jesse Helms of North Carolina. (We will leave it to concerned trade unionists to figure out why their elected "leadership" finds such compatability in the company of the most vehement anti-labor voices in congress.)

The setting for Solzhenitsyn also included a half dozen Cabinet officers, led by Pentagon chief James Schlesinger. Not incidentally, Schlesinger has for several months been pushing the idea of nuclear "first strike" in Korea.

The inherent racism involved in the suggestion of nuclear war against an Asian people—only Asians have already been so victimized—is apparent, as is the maniacal lack of even rudimentary humanistic values. (The racist argument also goes that peoples of color so lightly value human life.) But solzhenitzyn incorporates more than just these bestial ideologies in his cloud-cuckoo-land framework. It is as if the man has beèn living in a time capsule for 30 years, as if he has not heard that there is now nuclear parity, that the war he calls for will engulf him as well.

Writing in *The New York Times* recently, he argues that World War III is already over, that "we" of "the West" have lost it piece by piece, that now is the time to "make a stand" and wage World War IV.

For this demoniacal pronouncement, he is hailed as a spokesman of freedom. How free we will be in that thermonuclear incinerator in the sky! This demented personality, who makes claims as a voice of humanity, cares not at all for humanity; he who is called the voice of the "true Russia" in fact cares not for his own country.

In the same Washington speech urging war in Korea, he bemoans the fact that the U.S. made an alliance with the Soviet Union against Hitler. The Third Reich, which was responsible for the deaths of 20 million of his countrymen, was apparently preferable to this alleged Russian patriot. Caring (in the name of patriotism) so little for his own nation, it is small wonder he cares in the name of humanity so little for the peoples of the world.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a fraud, perpetrated on the world by those who long for yesteryear and are prepared to blow us all to smithereens in an attempt to march backward in time. Still, much to their dismay, the march forward in time continues. They are outside the forces of history and this drives them still madder. They may therefore be more dangerous than ever, but lovers of and spokesmen for freedom and peace they ain't.

MEMO FROM AKFIC EXECUTIVE BOARD

We have received numerous inquiries regarding a series of advertisements that have appeared recently in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* on the Korean situation.

In response to these inquiries we wish to state that the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center and Korea Focus are not associated with the publication of the above advertisements. We are neither a sponsor nor a signer of these advertisements. Any comments and inquiries regarding such advertisements coming to our office are misdirected and should be forwarded to the newspapers carrying such advertisements and the signers and sponsors of these advertisements.

Senate Bill Threatens Right to Publish

There is a bill before the congress which, if passed, would in effect push our country further into a police state. S. 1 (Senate Bill 1) was fathered by former Attorney General John Mitchell (one of Nixon's Watergate criminals) in order to build into the law secrecy in all matters relating to "national security" (the umbrella under which criminal Nixon's Watergate crimes were committed) and to stifle public protest of all kinds.

S. 1, called The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, a 753-page bill now before the Senate, would, among other things, do the following:

Create an official secrets act, giving the government virtually impregnable power to censor all information relating to defense and foreign affairs—*against us.*

Impose severe penalties, both on government employees who "communicated" classified information and on "unauthorized" persons who received it.

Make investigative reporting of the kind that exposed Watergate all but impossible, and the First Amendment the bedrock of all our freedoms, would be undercut—*AGAINST US.*

Make peaceful protest legally hazardous, and punish people for mere acts of advocacy under the riot provision—*AGAINST US.*

Restore the Smith Act, used in the Truman-McCarthy era witch-hunt trials, by outlawing the "incitement" of others to engage in conduct that "would facilitate" the destruction of the government. Membership in an instigating group would be grounds for arrest. The government could imprison people merely for talking about revolution. *AGAINST US.*

Encourage government invasion of privacy through wiretapping and electronic surveillance—*AGAINST OUR OFFICE.*

Promote future Watergates by protecting public servants from criminal penalties for any illegal act "required or authorized" in the performance of their duties, like illegal FBI searches, breakins, bugging & planting of incriminating evidence—*AGAINST US.*

"The enactment of S. 1 would constitute an unparalleled disaster for the system of individual rights in the United States," according to eminent legal authorities at Harvard and Yale Law Schools.

For example, if S. 1 were the law of the land today the staff of Korea Focus might be subject to severe penalties for daring to write about our government's nuclear war policies.

It is shocking that this bill which the Nixon criminals spawned is being heard before the Senate Judiciary Committee and is actually coming before the Senate for a vote in the near future.

We must stop S. 1. It has too many defects to be amended without threatening our civil liberties. Ask you two Senators to help defeat this dangerous bill, or lose your vote.

Please make note of our new mailing address and phone PO Box 252, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025, (212) 989-0518

Book Review

For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, by Kim Il Sung, N.Y.: International Publishers, 1975, $3.25, 230 pp.

These selections from the works of President Kim Il Sung, leader of the Korean people are more than just of historical interest to U.S. readers. The urgency of their message deeply involves the American and Korean people.

For three decades U.S. troops have occupied south Korea, fostering and maintaining an artificial division of the country. This split has brought the Korean people enormous suffering and innumerable personal tragedies. Today, even the most elementary rights of mutual visits and exchange of mail between families and friends in North and South Korea are absent. Millions of people in both parts of the country have no knowledge as to the whereabouts of relatives and close friends, and whether they are dead or alive. The fact that new generations of Korean youth are growing up in a divided land only deepens the inherent tragedy.

The documents collected in this book demonstrate that the President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, from the very first days of this division, advanced reasonable, practical and principled proposals to unite the Korean people. The reader will see their exceptional merit in the fundamental fact that whatever the shape of the proposals made, they were, and are, designed to permit the Korean people, democratically and without outside interference, to peacefully solve for themselves the question of reunification.

The works of Kim Il Sung are filled with ardent patriotism and a deep and moving love for his people, north and south.

In the years, which followed the great victory over fascism in World War II, irresistible winds of change, among them the desire of hundreds of millions of people for national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America, swept through the world.

Yet from the first days in September 1945,

U.S. government policy toward Korea has been aggressive, imperialist, unjust. In 1950, to thwart the unanimous will of the Korean people for a united nation, the U.S. armed forces unleashed a holocaust in Korea. When the flames of this terrible war subsided, every city and village in the north was destroyed and millions of men, women and children were murdered and mutilated, along with hundreds of thousands of American youth.

Since the 1953 armistice which ended the U.S. aggression, the U.S. government has maintained more than 40,000 soldiers and nuclear forces in south Korea. This enormous burden for the Korean and American people is maintained despite the fact that the armistice calls for complete withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification of the country. Morover, in direct violation of the 1953 agreements, the U.S. signed a "treaty" with its own creation, the tyrannical regime in the south, extending foreign occupation interminably.

The just proposals placed forth by President Kim Il Sung have the staunch support of the overwhelming majority of governments, statesmen and peoples throughout the world. In our own country, increasing numbers of Senators and Congressmen, influential people in and outside of government, recognize the need to bring this dubious U.S. policy to an end. We have neither the right nor the need to perpetuate the colonial status of South Korea. It is time to withdraw all our troops and rearrange our relations with all of Korea on a peaceful, mutually beneficial basis. These writings of President Kim Il Sung are a major contribution toward that noble end.

D.L.L.

FOR THE INDEPENDENT, PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

BY KIM IL SUNG

As thousands of U.S. troops garrisoned in the southern part of Korea continue to threaten world peace, this selection of articles, speeches and interviews by the outstanding leader of the Korean people is clearly of more than historic interest for the U.S. reader. Covering a period from 1948 through 1974, these writings on the question of reunification spell out the democratic and peaceful proposals which the DPRK has put forward to solve this pressing problem.

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Ghost of the Beast of Belsen Ressurected at the DMZ

Just to prove that the Beast of Belsen was no myth and that throwbacks to subhuman monsters are still possible, a creature named General James F, Hollingsworth has emerged from the Neanderthal thickets of Texas to declare to the world that he can end any war in nine days; that in particular he will be more than glad to lead his 183,000 U.S.-South Korean troops against the North Korean Communists if and when they cross the DMZ; and that he and his armies will "murder" every last soldier of the enemy. Total war against the total enemy is the tactic of this nine-day wonder.

In this day of nuclear weapons and doomsday bombs and in an era when imperialists themselves have been chastened by the unquenchable resistance of the Indochinese people, such adventurism and braggadocio may sound incredible. But there is such a creature in the U.S. brass, see Wall Street Journal 11/13/75, and he boasts three stars on his shirt, and is referred too as an "unguided missile" and "hip shooter," as he struts about South Korea like a redneck bantam rooster spoiling for a fight with anything that moves on the northern side of the DMZ.

We should remember that a President named Harry Truman in his trigger-happy way freely dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and was also an "unguided missile" and a hip shooter." We should never forget that a creature named Adolf Hitler concocted the concept of a total aggressive war of extermination against Communism and other "diseases" of civilization; that he bombastically proclaimed:

"We are barbarians. We want to be barbarians. It is an honorable title"; and that he and his fellow Nazis preached and practiced the principle of killing and total destruction, not only of Communists, Slavs, and Jews, but of Germans themselves.

Is General Hollingsworth's lustful cry for blood in Korea today a mere passing subjective dementia? By no means. He represents one sector of



"Beast of Belsen" is what the Belsen concentration camp inmates called the Nazi sadist Ilsa Koch a camp official fond of fashioning inmates skins into lamp shades.

imperialist opinion in the Pentagon and government which has persisted since the days when General MacArthur romped to the Yalu River and sought in vain to drop atomic bombs on China. He is the mouthpiece of those who would like to provoke a new war in Korea.

But the world and mankind will not be entrusted to barbarians. We live in the world of 1976—the world of self-determination of peoples, of the equality of nations, of anti-colonialism, of the defusing of explosive adventurism, of détente. The Beast of the DMZ, like the Beast of Belsen, must go. Let the voice and will of civilized peoples prevail. Let the Korean people decide their own destiny, and the American people demand democracy at home and abroad. Barbarism is not honorable; only civilization, dignity, and peace are.

HOWARD L. PARSONS